Introduction
The defence relationship between India and the Soviet Union (now Russia) began immediately after India’s independence, when it was dependent on western nations for its defence equipment. India slowly started to shift its reliance to Soviet defence equipment by the 1970s. Estimates suggest that approximately 85% of the defence imports were from the Soviet Union (Indian Express, 2022). The India-Russia defence relationship expanded when they signed the ‘Indo-Russian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation’ in August 1971. A clause in the treaty stated that if India were attacked by any powers in the world, it would be considered an attack on the Soviet Union, and Moscow would send its forces in India’s defence. This helped India in its war against Pakistan leading to liberation of Bangladesh (Atri, 2023).
With the procurement of the MiGs produced by the Soviet Union, the Indo-Soviet defence relations only moved forward in a positive direction. A major change came in 1991 with the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The newly elected Russian President Boris Yeltsin seemed uncertain, which is stated by B. M. Jain when he writes, “His policy was characterised by idiosyncrasies, narrow egotistical interests and erratic political decisions. Initially, his foreign policy veered around three concentric circles which he assigned top priority to, cultivating close and friendly relations with the United States in return for massive economic assistance that was needed for Russia’s economic recovery. His next priorities were Europe and Asia. In Asia, India was assigned lower priority than South Korea and China” (Jain, 2003). This temporarily changed the course of the relationship between India and the newly formed Russia.
This is shown by a delayed visit to India in 1993 by the Russian President, which can be attributed to the internal issues of Russia due to the economic shock therapy. Thereon, the India-Russia relationship was relatively stable. It was significant, but not without its hiccups. The 2014 Russian aggression under the current regime of Vladimir Putin put India in a very uncomfortable situation internationally. India abstained from a condemnation resolution against Russia for annexation of Crimea. There has constantly been a clash of interest between Russia and the West which has put Russia in an uncomfortable position. India has been developing its relations with the Western nations, primarily the United States of America and France, especially in the field of defence.
The clash between USA, France, and Russia on issues such as the Middle East, Ukraine War, and others have constantly caused India to give statements in favour on both sides. We further look to explore in this part how the relationship between Russia and India has evolved in the field of defence, and where we can expect it to be in the coming years, covering 3 major points:
- India and Russia’s strategic partnership
- Russia and the West at war and India’s role
- Indian-Russian Defence Equipment Manufacturing
India and Russia’s Strategic Partnership
Russia is a key partner for defence equipment manufacturing for India, and the countries have collaborated together on multiple occasions. The BrahMos Missile, as explained later, is a ‘supersonic cruise missile’ jointly developed by both nations, which is a key attraction for India’s defence exports today. The Sukhoi fighter jets even today form an integral part of the Indian air force’s strength along with Su-30 and Su-30 MKIs. There are ongoing discussions about the possibility of a manufacturing facility in India to develop the Su-57s in India with Technology Transfer which could fast track India’s 6th Generation fighter jet program (Economic Times, 2025).
“While Russia remains an important defence partner for India, the story of the last 20 years has been the growing security cooperation with the US and its allies in Europe and Asia” (Mohan, 2022). Mohan (2022) briefly writes about not only the depth of the partnership between both but also focuses on its ever changing nature. Due to the emergence of India as a new regional power and important global player, there has been a rise in the number of partnership proposals. Global defence and economic giants such as the United States, Japan, Australia, France and others are now growing ever more interested in relations with India. Most of these new partners for India are providing India an increasing access to their top grade military technology which has also made Russia do the same.
Russia and India have jointly worked on various defence propositions; however, this near-perfect partnership is not free from its problems. “India’s decision to diversify its arms imports came as a major blow to Russia’s interests. This resulted in a slow but steady decrease in Russia’s share in supplies of arms to India; during 2012-16 it was 68%, and in 2022 it dropped to 59%” (Rodkiewicz, 2023). A drop of 9% of India’s export order for Russian defence equipment, taking into account the increase in defense expenditure budget by the Indian government, must have created an impact. This drop can also be attributed to India’s new demand for a) Transfer of Technology and b) manufacturing facilities in India. India, having generated significant demand for defence equipment, now has great bargaining power that allows it to switch almost seamlessly between Russian, American, Italian, Swedish, Japanese, French, and other deals.
Russia, however, has a significant bargaining chip over India, which is the large amount of defence equipment exported to India. Russian equipment is not compatible with much of the western equipment and requires a large amount of complementary Russian technology. The Western Nations, on the other hand, also oppose fusion with Russian technology due to mutual mistrust. Russia, therefore, has a large amount of equipment that the Indians will have to buy, to complement much of their current technology.
India is planning to counteract this using its ‘Make in India’ defence initiative and the transfer of technology, as mentioned earlier. It should also be noted that India has received significant technology transfer from Russia in its military dealings, which India can use with relevant modifications and make it compatible with the West. Russia is still much ahead in technological research in comparison to India, which is amply clear by the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA). India was supposed to develop AMCA as a 5th Generation Aircraft; however, due to issues with the indigenous Kaveri engine, it has been postponed to a 6th generation aircraft. Russia has begun not only the inclusion of its own 5th generation aircraft, Su-75 Checkmate, but also begun discussions for its export (Nikolov, 2024).
Since the cold war era, Russia has been constantly trying to engage with India even more comprehensively. The boom in the Russian defence industry began before the 2022 war against Ukraine as a part of its preparation for the war. “In late November 2022, Vladimir Putin announced that since the beginning of the year, Russia had exported weapons worth $8 billion” (Vasily Kashin, 2023, 115). This shows that despite the war, Russia has significant production capacity to export weapons to other countries. The countries that received Russian defence equipment also includes India’s S-400 SAM (Surface to Air Missile) system.
“Russia’s ability to export advanced weapons systems to India is likely to increase after the conflict, as Russia will likely have significant excess production capacity for surface-to-air missiles, cruise missiles, anti-tank missiles, armored vehicles, and other weapons” (Kashin, 2023). We can therefore understand that once the war comes to end, Russia’s excess stockpile of weapons would be sold off at lower prices. Therefore, we can expect a rise in Russian sales for defence equipment, which may come at the cost of Western defence exports to most neutral and opportunistic countries.
Another reason why this partnership is for the long term stems from the mutual acceptance of its territories under global scrutiny, such as Kashmir in India. India, too, despite immense global pressure has not yet outright criticized the Russian aggression. The Indian Prime Minister in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) had said, “This is not an era for war,” in context of the ongoing conflicts across the globe without naming anyone. However, India continues to have economic ties with Russia, which reinforces their bilateral relationship. Another underestimated key factor is that the comprehensible medium-term objectives of both countries are not conflicting. Both Russia and India have voiced their opinions against US domination of the International world order for a long time, Russia more sternly than India. Both India and Russia aspire for a multipolar world order, where global power is not concentrated in the hands of a single hegemonic power. This shared strategic outlook brings them together and is reflected in their active participation in BRICS, which aims to promote a balanced international system.
Between 2022 and 2023, the bilateral trade between India and Russia increased by 250%, and its value now amounts to almost $50 billion (Rodkiewicz and Centre For Eastern Studies, 2023, 5). A significant portion of this trade is attributed to trade of crude oil, which is why we have constantly emphasised on the “reinforcing ties” between both countries especially after the war, since Russia’s options have shrunken while that of India only seem to be increasing. There is a small issue being faced here—the trade imbalance. The increasing trade between both has been to India’s detriment with a severe trade deficit for India. India has been constantly asking for access to the Russian market to correct the trade imbalance which Russia is more than happy to grant, since they have an excess supply of the Indian currency (Laskar, 2024). Russia is hoping to grant India market access, and then, looking to invest the excess into the Indian market, which is beneficial for India as well.
This shows the surprising impact of the Ukraine-Russia conflict on India-Russia relations. The increasing impact of defence trade as well is most likely to further strengthen the ties. Therefore, we ascertain that the ties between both these countries are going to positively move forward in the future as well, due to the multidimensional opportunities to be explored.
Russia and the West at war and India’s role
Russia invaded Ukraine on 24th February, 2022. Russia labelled their military movement into Ukrainian territory as a “Special Military Operation” launched against the ‘Neo-Nazis’ of Ukraine. Russia had, before the military strike, declared their support for the Ukrainian secessionist region of Donetsk and Luhansk, which are predominantly Russian-speaking territories and have seen widespread secessionist movements. While the ‘Special Military Operation’ had started between Ukrainian Neo-Nazis and the Russian military, it soon seemed to have taken a Cold War style ‘proxy war’ turn very quickly. This sudden switch may be attributable to the insistence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to include Ukraine into its fold, which has been strongly opposed by Russia. Ukraine today is essentially being used as a proxy battlefield to fight for dominance and control. The coloured revolutions in Ukraine are a testament to the proxy war on-going for a long period now.
“Officially, the invasion of Ukraine began as Russia’s ‘special military operation.’ Unofficially, it soon morphed into a US/NATO-led proxy war against Russia in Ukraine” (Steinbock 2023). It is well understood that controlling Ukraine is seen as a strategic step toward dominating Western Europe, especially the former Soviet satellite states, which could then be used to shift the narrative against Russia. India is in a unique dilemma in regard to this war. India, which is still majorly dependent on Russian arms for its defence needs and for other non-military partnership needs, could not explicitly condemn Russian aggression into Ukrainian territory. India, however, having developed significantly closer ties to the Western nations, was definitely expected to support the Ukrainian cause.
In a way, India makes the most of this situation. Saudi Arabia at this time had decided to raise the price of oil since the United States had sanctioned Russia. Supply of Russian oil had been made very difficult. ‘SWIFT’, the international payments system, removed Russia as a member country, hence conducting international transactions became almost impossible. Russia was not allowed to use the Dollar, and its foreign assets were frozen. India decided to set up ‘Nostro-Vostro’ accounts to conduct trade in Rupee-Ruble terms. India also negotiated a discounted trade of Russian oil, which led to Russia becoming the largest oil supplier to India. The Vladivostok to Chennai maritime corridor is estimated to reduce the time required to transport cargo between the Indian and Russian Ports of the Far East Region by up to 16 days (Business Standard, 2024).
India ended up leveraging the situation to its maximum advantage. India was, due to its increasing trade with Russia, being criticised constantly. India not only brokered deals with Russia, it also received concessions from the United States and other countries of the West. India was now being offered impressive deals from all sides. The United States, in an attempt to bring India closer to the Western alliances, offered F-35 jets, which are 5th generation high technology fighter jets. “India’s tightrope walk on the Ukraine war has been described as ‘strategic ambivalence.’ Far from it—it actually reflects New Delhi’s deliberate choice, even if a constrained one” (Tellis, 2022). This shows the dynamic nature of the foreign policy as followed by the Indian government. The Indian government has been adamant about its ‘Strategic Autonomy’ which has been very important for India considering the turbulent nature of the International order, due to the slow but steady shift towards a ‘Multilateral Order’.
“The multi-alignment doctrine seeks to maximise India’s national interests without compromising its inviolable commitment to strategic autonomy” (Verma, 2024). While the Indian government has verbally taken a neutral position, even a neutral position on such a divisive issue is in reality a position that ends up favouring Russia. India has had a silent change in its foreign policy. Indian foreign policy has shifted from Non-Alignment to ‘Multi-Alignment’, where India is ready to engage with almost every nation to their mutual advantage (Raghavan, 2017).
One important issue that had emerged silently in the Global South amidst the Russia-Ukraine War were ‘Their Issues’. India saw the opportunity as soon as it presented itself. India took the lead and began to raise issues of the Global South on the world stage once again. India had conducted a meeting with over 50 leaders of various Global South countries before the G20 conference in New Delhi. Adding Africa as the latest member to the G20, making it the G21, added even more weight behind its unclaimed stake to the leadership of the Global South. Thus, India has been able to leverage the war and cement its position in international politics.
Indian-Russian Defence Equipment Manufacturing
India has been constantly working on its ‘Make in India’ initiative. It has been working towards manufacturing defence equipment and exporting those equipment and using it for their domestic needs. It is to be noted that India’s low industrial base is attributed to its low industrialisation, low income, and hence, low level of capital. The economy and low industrial base (whose output at that time was defence industry has always been a very capital intensive industry and has been ignored for a long time. The Indian government, however, never gave up the will for production of indigenous weapons industry. A good example of the same could be the ambitious HF 24 Marut as conceived by the former Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Now, however, the macroeconomic indicators for India along with the structural changes in the banking sector and easier availability of credit has made this more possible.
“A beginning was made in 1998, when India and Russia signed an inter-governmental agreement to jointly produce BrahMos supersonic cruise missile” (Behera, 2013). After the attempts of self-reliance in the defence manufacturing industry and facing unique problems, especially in the second phase of defence production, India took on the role of a ‘Co-Producer’, and one of the first attempts at this was made with the Russian government. India did not limit itself to just the manufacturing of missiles, but expanded to other areas as well in 2007. “Taking the BrahMos model further, in 2007 India and Russia signed two inter-governmental agreements for the co-development and coproduction of two major aircraft projects: Multi Role Transport Aircraft (MTA), and the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA). As per the agreements, India has a 50% investment share in both projects” (ibid.). Another encouraging factor here was the inclusion of the private sector in the defence industries which would inevitably get rid of redundancies, bureaucratic inefficiencies, better research and development along with greater advancements in technology.
India has been emerging as a great centre of production of defence goods, and according to governmental records, India’s defence exports have increased to a record high of “Rs 23,622 crore (approx. US$ 2.76 Billion) in the Financial Year (FY) 2024-25. A growth of Rs 2,539 crore or 12.04% has been registered in the just-concluded FY over the defence exports figures of FY 2023-24, which were Rs 21,083 crore” (Ministry of Defence, 2025). This clearly shows the speed at which the defence equipment production capacity has been increasing constantly over a period of time. India offers a great opportunity here to emerge as a key producer of defence equipment for the Global South and relatively poorer countries, as a very good option against the expensive weapons of the West. The Global South is the region infested by multiple conflicts and civil wars and require a constant supply of weapons, and pay for the same to the Global North. This cycle creates a situation where prosperity gets transferred to the Global North and leaves the Global South as miserly. A lower cost of weapons would give them a significant amount of money to spend on the welfare of its citizens as well.
Another positive aspect is that India and Russia have constantly collaborated through ‘Transfer of Technology’; agreements between both countries and the fructification of these agreements are displayed in the falling import dependencies of domestic manufacturers such as Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and Bharat Electronic Limited (BEL). The import dependency of BEL in particular has fallen from 36.41% in FY 2006-07 to 33.96% in FY 2010-11. The Kelkar committee had submitted its report particularly on the issue of defence structure in India. The major recommendations of Part One of the report are as follows (Behera, 2013):
- Preparation of a 15-year long-term plan forming the basis of an acquisition programme
- Sharing of the long-term capital acquisition plans of the armed forces with the domestic industry
- Identification of entry points for the private sector in the acquisition process
- Identification of Raksha Udyog Ratnas (RUR)/ Champions from the private sector
- Policy framework to promote the participation of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in defence production
- Setting up a dedicated and professional agency to undertake defence acquisition
- Defence R&D opportunities both for the DRDO and the industry
- Provision of offsets for procurement contracts valued at Rs 300 crore or more
- Re-examine the concept of a negative list for defence exports, and the setting up of an export marketing organisation
We can consider Russia to be the prime partner in the pursuit of a strong defence industry in India, supporting our domestic production along with exporting these weapons to other countries. It should also be noted that India is using its defence exports as a key factor in playing international politics by exporting the BrahMos missile to the Philippines. The Philippines already had disputes over territory with China, and India seems to be using the Southeast Asian crises of the ‘Nine Dash Line’ to limit the Chinese to the South East China Sea and involve them in South East Asia, ensuring the waters of the Indian oceans stay closed to the Chinese ships.
Conclusion
From the above analysis, we can certainly conclude that India and Russia share a great depth of defence ties that have only strengthened over time. We can make note of the bilateral defence treaties to strengthen our argument in the same regard. “According to the estimates quoted in the Russian media, Russia’s military equipment sales to India is worth $1 billion per annum. Added to it, the bilateral defence agreements since 1998, which include the supply of 90 state-of-the-art SU30 fighters, are expected to fetch for Russia another $4 billion annually” (Gogoi, 2002). These estimates put a number on the depth and growing bond between both the countries. Russia and India also share their medium-term goal of a multipolar world order, which assures both countries that there is no proper intersection of interests in the medium term.
It should be noted, however, that Indian is a growing manufacturer for defence equipment, especially preferred now by the Global South. India also uses its position in the Global South to support its arms trade. At this point, the arms lobby of both the countries could be confronted by each other and their interests can clash. It would be beneficial if the arms lobbies of both the countries can divide regions of influence in an informal agreement. Indian and Russian partnership is also key for the development of Indian Military Research and Development in the future, considering the increasing tension in South Asia. Russia is to be eventually confronted by the question of India versus China, since both of these countries have clashing interests in the Indian Ocean, in terms of Asian power dynamics along with their future outlook of the world order.
India seems to look forward to a more multilateral global order in the medium run; however, China looks to replace the United States as the sole hegemony of the international order, which will also conflict with the Russian interest in the medium-run. Russia and China, however, are close partners in creating a parallel world order against the Western influence. It should be noteworthy to see the balance between India and China, considering the short-term significance of China and the medium-term collaboration with India in the context of Russia. India has repeatedly stated that it will not be joining any sort of global bloc or military alliance to maintain its strategic autonomy; however, Russia and China seem to be working towards a similar possibility of cooperation between both of themselves.
Indo-Russo cooperation seems to have the scope to expand further, especially considering the rapidly advancing technology, along with the possible uses of Artificial Intelligence for military purposes, which could lead to big technological breakthroughs for both countries. India can use the indigenous development of its defence equipment to ensure that its geopolitical needs are also taken care of. Taking the example of the sale of BrahMos to the Philippines, which creates a balance of power in the South East Asian Sea, the Nine Dash Line conflict will involve China with the Southeast Asian nations. China, being bound to the South China Sea, ensures that it remains a regional superpower and is not able to permeate completely into the Indian Ocean. China is already attempting to undercut India in the Indian Ocean and reduce its options through creation of Kra Canal in Thailand, reducing India’s hold on the Malacca strait.
India and Russia can collaborate for other purposes to attain their medium-term goals without any major clashes of interest. We can foresee India and Russia working together for a long time in the future, especially in terms of producing Russian equipment in India, considering the sanctions on Russia. An example for the same could be the production of the AK-203 rifles in Amethi, which are also being exported. This collaboration would be beneficial for both India and Russia, and is a partnership that has been sewn together by Western sanctions and disapproval.
