Introduction
The recently concluded India-UK Free Trade Agreement (FTA) is a landmark deal in the growing strategic partnership between the two countries across wide-ranging industries including fintech, renewable energy, education, and even film production. A key aspect of this revitalised economic relationship is the ‘India-UK Vision 2035’, a roadmap for renewed defence partnership, forging a path to strategic alignment on shared issue areas.
Both India and the UK have a shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. The UK’s ‘Indo-Pacific Tilt’, first gaining emphasis in its 2021 Integrated Review, is now a permanent pillar of UK foreign policy. On the other hand, India is a growing pole of power in the world, increasingly exercising its autonomy and diversifying its strategic relationships. Under New Delhi’s push towards military modernisation, there has been strong interest in building up India’s indigenous defence capabilities. The roadmap proposed under Vision 2035 is part of the larger drive for diversification of strategic partnerships. Revitalisation of the India-UK bilateral defence relationship has the potential to catalyse this drive, and invigorate it by empowering private sector actors to take on a more active role in the indigenisation story.
India’s push towards defence modernisation
Since independence, India’s defence policy has seen some major shifts, but can be broadly described as a story of growing assertiveness as a result of rapid economic development in the late 20th century. Despite demonstrating nuclear capability in 1974, the exercise of self-restraint until officially recognising itself a nuclear state in 1998, is a representation of the gradualism New Delhi exhibited in its broader defence policy. Since liberalisation in the 1990s, and with the background of several wars with its neighbours, India’s appetite for growth in its defence spending has grown substantially.
India’s defence partnerships had been limited since independence, as it primarily relied on Russian (erstwhile Soviet) imports for its equipment needs. The new modernisation drive has an increased focus on indigenisation of India’s defence capabilities, prioritising investments in domestic manufacturing, and increasing export capabilities down the line. Notably, strategic partnerships have gained a newfound importance in this modernisation effort. New Delhi entered partnerships with key players, most significantly the US, France, and the UK, stepping outside its traditional reliance on Russia.
The defence budget in India has surged in the 21st century, with the past decade seeing a focus on modernisation and indigenisation. Part of the modernisation effort has been to diversify defence imports, while directing funds towards acquisition of advanced technologies to keep up with rapid leaps and further entwining of defence and tech. The India-UK Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) signed in July 2025 is another step in the right direction towards achieving these goals.
The India-UK partnership
As volatility created by an unpredictable US foreign policy has forced the international order to grapple with its consequences, the signing of Vision 2035, a 10-year roadmap for cooperation between India and the UK, comes at an opportune time for both partners. The plan aims to revitalise the bilateral relationship and covers economic growth, technology and innovation, defence and security, climate and clean energy, and education, which serve as its five core pillars (Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office & Prime Minister’s Office, 2025).
Prior to the signing of the agreement in 2025, the two have had a basic defence partnership that consisted primarily of joint exercises and limited import of equipment by India. One of the first airspace exercises between the two, Indradhanush, was conducted in 2006 in Gwalior (Deccan Herald, 2025). Procurement remained limited as well, to when the IAF and RAF first collaborated for India to acquire the SEPECAT Jaguar (Société Européenne de Production de l’avion Ecole de Combat et d’Appui Tactique), a British-French manufactured supersonic jet attack aircraft in 1979.
In 2004, a Strategic Partnership was signed between the two, with the stated goal of deepening bilateral ties ‘towards a new and dynamic partnership’ (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2007), to reinforce and expand programmes of joint military training and exercises. The joint declaration also covered the co-production of defence equipment, resulting in key collaborations such as the Hawk Advanced Jet Trainers produced by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in partnership with BAE Systems (BAE Systems, n.d.).
The UK’s Integrated Review (IR), the official white paper comprehensively outlining the British government’s strategy on foreign policy, defence, security, and its international priorities, was published in March 2021 with the title ‘Global Britain in a competitive age’ (UK Cabinet Office, 2021). This IR prominently featured the UK’s famous ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’—a framework to deepen the UK’s engagement in the region (UK Cabinet Office, 2021). Against the backdrop of this tilt, India and UK signed their 2021 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (Prime Minister’s Office, India & Prime Minister’s Office, UK, 2021), which laid emphasis on increasing maritime cooperation, subsequently establishing an annual UK-India Maritime Dialogue. These foundational blocks eventually paved the way for the 2025 trade agreement.
India-UK Vision 2035
Background
Announced in 2025 by the Prime Ministers of India and the United Kingdom, the India-UK Vision 2035 is an ambitious agreement for stronger cooperation between the two countries along its stated five pillars, and on the basis of a core philosophy of ‘BRISK’, i.e. Business, Research, Innovation, Science and technology, and Knowledge (Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office & Prime Minister’s Office, 2025).
There is demonstrable desire and will to strengthen the partnership on both ends. From the point of view of the UK, its 2025 Strategic Defence Review outlines its defence priorities for the coming years, focusing on building national resilience, reiterating its commitment to NATO, and nurturing strong relationships with allies (UK Ministry of Defence, 2025).
The conception of the UK-India Technology Security Initiative (TSI) in 2024 was a step closer to the creation of a robust ecosystem for joint innovation and development of critical and emerging technologies (Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute, 2025). The Defence Partnership-India (DP-I), another initiative within the UK state apparatus, is a unit within the UK’s Ministry of Defence dedicated to streamlining processes related to defence procurement and technology exchange between the two countries, launched by the signing of a business-to-business (B2B) weapon-manufacturing contract between Thales UK and Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) (UK Government, 2025).
On the Indian side, reforms aimed at faster procurement of defence technology have been adopted under the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) designed in 2020 (Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 2024). Under the new procedure, norms for foreign direct investment (FDI) have been liberalised, fostering collaboration between private companies, MSMEs, and startups. Making the defence industry in India business-friendly is key not only to more efficient adoption of efforts under the FTA, but also towards meeting the broader goal of modernisation as businesses and private actors gain confidence and autonomy to operate in the erstwhile highly red-taped space.
The roadmap
The CETA aims to reduce barriers for B2B collaboration between India and the UK. For UK manufacturers, it offers reduced barriers and new avenues for exporting components, systems, and services, alongside opportunities for deeper collaboration and investment within India’s rapidly expanding market. For Indian companies, partnering with British entities provides access to advanced technology, engineering expertise, and strengthens domestic manufacturing capabilities, aligning with national priorities like Atmanirbhar Bharat (Feehan, 2025). It is notable that B2B interaction in defence was limited prior to the adoption of the agreement. With the involvement of Indian businesses in deals signed under the CETA, the role of industry becomes enhanced in the defence manufacturing story.
The outcome of the roadmap will be anchored in sustained high-level political engagement, with regular meetings between the two Prime Ministers, and annual reviews conducted by the Foreign Ministers. There is an increased focus on co-development of advanced weapon technologies, which has taken into fold private sector companies from both countries – Rolls Royce, Thales from the UK, and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) from India, for instance.
Key Programmes
Naval propulsion (EPCP)
The Electric Propulsion Capability Partnership (EPCP) is a notable deal in this roadmap, wherein the Indian Navy is set out to buy cutting-edge propulsion engines produced by Rolls-Royce, in order to advance India’s maritime capabilities. The MT30 engines will introduce electric propulsion to the Indian Navy’s future fleet, allowing significant advantages over traditional mechanical propulsion. The collaboration would enable Indian destroyers, frigates, and potentially even aircraft carriers to be more efficient through reduced fuel dependency (Indian Defence Research Wing, 2025). The Royal Navy pioneered the use of hybrid propulsion and has implemented it in several of its modern warships. The MT30 powers some of the world’s most advanced naval platforms, including the US Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship Freedom Class variant, aircraft carriers of the Royal Navy such as the Queen Elizabeth, Republic of Korea Navy’s FFX-Batch II frigate, and the Japanese Maritime Defence Force’s 30FFM frigate (Rolls-Royce, 2021). The introduction of this technology to the Indian Navy’s warships would be a welcome and much-needed change, especially in light of India’s attempts at modernising its naval fleet.
Aerospace and Jet Engines (JEACT)
A key technology transfer programme under this roadmap is the Jet Engine Advanced Core Technologies (JEACT) initiative, which would aid the development of India’s indigenous aero-engine capabilities. The programme brings together key players in the space, Rolls-Royce, HAL, and Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML) to foster collaboration and co-development as part of the next generation of India’s Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) (Defence Star, n.d.). The significance of such technology transfer is that the precedence of intellectual property sharing is sure to benefit other branches of the military by laying the groundwork for advancing next generation software systems in the indigenous manufacturing sphere.
Lightweight Multirole Missiles
Under the roadmap, an agreement worth GBP 350 million was reached whereby New Delhi is set to purchase Lightweight Multirole Missile (LMM) systems manufactured by Thales UK (The Times of India, 2024). The LMM, also dubbed as the Martlet, is a lightweight, precision-guided, versatile missile and has been part of the UK’s military aid package to Ukraine since 2022. The LMM is an effective defence system particularly against unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), or drones, however, as it stands currently, it is but a cost-efficient gain to fill short-term gaps. While this deal is hardly more than an import agreement, the hope is that it has the potential to open up avenues for longer-term cooperation on sophisticated weaponry between manufacturers from the two countries.
Maritime Security Cooperation
India and the UK have a shared interest in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The maintenance and protection of a free and open Indo-Pacific forms a solid basis for cooperation in the maritime domain (Jaybhay, 2025), which has emerged as a major pillar in bilateral ties. The two have jointly established an Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), focusing on capacity-building, training, and bolstering security in the Indo-Pacific region. As part of this initiative, the Regional Maritime Security Centre of Excellence (RMSCE) has come into order to serve as a framework as well as a review mechanism for collaboration in the area of maritime security. While further details of this particular initiative have not yet been declared, based on previous engagements, it is likely that the scope of the IPOI would be enhancement of interoperability, sharing of best practices, and improvement of maritime domain awareness via joint exercises.
Challenges and constraints
Although Vision 2035 has vast potential to contribute towards India’s Aatmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliant India) mission, there are constraints on the degree to which it can achieve what it promises. Limitations placed by bureaucratic and procedural hurdles could impact the pace of implementation of plans laid out under the roadmap. Independent B2B collaboration in the defence space is a relatively new phenomenon in India, and will require intentional and efficient removal of red-tapism. To remedy this very problem, the Government of India has introduced the twin frameworks of the Defence Acquisition Procedure (2020) and the Defence Procurement Manual (2025) to reform the defence procurement ecosystem. Key reforms include ease of approvals by removing procedural bottlenecks, standardising procedures across all armed forces and the Ministry of Defence (MoD), and the promotion of a collaborative apparatus where in private sector actors are treated as valued partners (Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 2024). The UK’s ‘Defence Partnership-India’ (DPI) unit within its own MoD was also established to serve a similar purpose—streamlining procedures and making B2B dealings easier within this framework.
The other limitation of the roadmap as it stands is the scope of the deals that have been made so far. For instance, the import of LMM systems by India has come into the purview of debate as these are neither more advanced than India’s existing missile systems, nor filling a particular inventory gap. While it is a step in the right direction towards establishing future pathways for co-development and knowledge exchange, especially in order to bring Thales into the fold, it is also questionable whether a purchase of GBP 350 million is an efficient allocation of resources (Das, n.d.). Besides, it is an import of UK-manufactured equipment, therefore not contributing to the indigenisation agenda.
At this early stage of the defence roadmap, there is also a lack of tangible frameworks for review and feedback. The IPOI, for instance, is a concise and goal-oriented initiative for maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region, however, it is a conceptual framing akin to previous engagements between navies of the two. Maritime cooperation has always been a crucial pillar of the bilateral defence relationship, but tangible outcomes of the same have been limited primarily to joint exercises, and now, co-development of propulsion engines. Details of the RMSCE are yet to be carved out, but the hope is that it serves as a mechanism for high-level policy-oriented meetings for an actionable agenda, to protect and preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific, a norm that lies at the bedrock of the India-UK maritime relationship.
The Path Forward
India is emerging as a crucial pole of power, not just in the Indo-Pacific, but also globally. With the ruptures in the world order becoming more pronounced due to unpredictability, caused by rapidly declining US hegemony, self-reliance and diversification of partnerships and alliances is becoming the need of the hour—a path India has been on and continues to forge for itself. Vision 2035 has the potential to render a large stride in such efforts.
The push towards co-development and co-production of weapons towards military modernisation is a step forward in New Delhi’s Aatmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliant India) mission. Key developments to look out for in the short to medium term is how cooperation in the maritime sector is fostered, especially in the context of the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), and decisions resulting from it. In particular, this normative framework on collaboration has the potential to bring into force a security arrangement not dissimilar to QUAD. While it is not part of Indian foreign policy to enter ‘alliances’, a security arrangement with pre-existing partners would not be unprecedented. The initiative could lay the groundwork for an alignment of naval forces by opening up to other partners in the region. This mitigates possible constraints that could arise out of the UK’s limited presence in the area, especially given its most recent Strategic Review signalling a prioritisation of NATO.
For India, its neighbourhood and the broader IOR would be a sensible place to start engaging more deeply with strategic partners and also forge newer partnerships to begin with. The MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions) doctrine, when combined with the UK’s Indo-Pacific Tilt, could enable and encourage Indian presence in Southeast Asia. Deeper engagement with ASEAN is key to unlocking India’s goals of becoming a more prominent arms exporter in the Global South.
The Vision 2035 roadmap is bound to have a positive impact on attracting investments in the domestic defence sector as well. Liberalisation of B2B norms could open up more avenues for FDI, not necessarily limited to private actors in the UK. The GoI’s attempts at making the space industry-friendly via its reforms in defence procurement is already a step closer towards ease of doing business and investing in Indian defence. Further empowerment of domestic players would be welcome, especially given current appetite in the indigenous manufacturing landscape (Jayakumar, 2025). For successful and effective indigenisation, it is essential to replace imports with domestic development and production of equipment. The easing of approvals processes and reduction in bureaucratic hurdles would be key in this case.
Conclusion
The Vision 2035 defence-industrial roadmap shows plenty of promise when it comes to revitalising and deepening the relationship between India and the UK. One of the more significant aspects of the renewed partnership is that it opens up avenues for collaboration in the development of complex weapon systems through its technology transfer and knowledge sharing pillar. The sharing of intellectual property, especially via B2B engagement, is a crucial node in building trust and fostering long-standing partnerships. The future of defence partnerships is likely to be forged by industry, enabled by strong policy frameworks and supported by streamlined procurement procedures. The agreement has so far demonstrated a keen drive in both partners to commit to the roadmap. Despite short-term challenges, primarily on the systemic front, there are reasons to be optimistic about the future of this partnership. In the long term, the UK and India stand to make major gains if the relationship is treated with intentionality, its potential optimised, and eventually grown through sustained engagement.
