Framing India’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy
Terrorism has been an unfortunate reality in India for several decades. In India’s independent history, the country faced several threats from internal and external terrorism groups, claiming several lives. The leadership of India has strongly opposed and drafted laws against terrorism over the decades to confront these unprompted instances of violence. In a recent move, the Ministry of Home Affairs announced the National Counter-Terrorism Policy & Strategy, aligning with its principled approach of ‘Zero Tolerance’ against terrorism in the country. The policy, which is also known as ‘PRAHAAR’, aims to prevent terror attacks to protect Indian citizens and their interests. It also aims to respond with swift and proportionate action against security threats and aggregate internal capacity to achieve synergy in a whole-of-government approach. It will follow the ‘Rule of Law’ and human rights-based processes for mitigation of threats and align counter-terrorism efforts with international efforts and build resilience through a whole-of-society approach (MoHA, 2026).
The comprehensive counter-terrorism framework has been set up to address the evolving nature of contemporary terrorism. The new policy acknowledges and aims to counter how terrorist groups now threaten India’s security on multiple fronts and critical sectors of the economy (Singh, 2026). Although it would be inaccurate to say this is India’s first counter-terrorism policy, it can be argued that this is the first such ‘Comprehensive and Proactive’ policy incorporating the zero-tolerance doctrine against different forms of terror. The central purpose of the PRAHAAR policy appears to be synthesising different aspects of defense against terrorism, including the prevention achieved through intelligence gathering and dissemination by the Intelligence Bureau and the Joint Task Force on Intelligence, and the operationalisation of the Multiple Agency Centre (MoHA, 2026). It further highlights the importance of human rights and the ‘Rule of Law’, under anti-terrorism laws, stating that India is a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It makes a case against the conditions conducive to terrorism, arguing that terrorist groups make efforts to radicalise Indian youth to violent extremism, highlighting the steps taken by law enforcement agencies to disrupt the designs of terrorist groups and the police response to identified recruited youth.
Defining Terrorism
The recognition of terrorism comes from its violence against innocent victims; however, there is no set definition for terrorism in international law. However, broad or imprecise definitions of terrorism can create greater scope for inconsistent interpretation and potential misuse. One widely accepted definition of terrorism is by the 2010 UN Special Rapporteur, Martin Scheinin on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedom which states that “Terrorism means an action or attempted action where: 1)The action: a) Constituted the intentional taking of hostages; or b) is intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to one or more members of the general population or segments of it; or c) involved lethal or serious physical violence against one or more members of the general population or segments of it; 2) The action is done or attempted with the intention of: a) provoking a state of terror in the general public or segment of it; or b) compelling a government or international organisation to do or abstain from doing something; 3) The action corresponds to: a) the definition of a serious offence in national law, enacted for the purpose of complying with international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism or with the resolution of the Security Council relating to terrorism; or b) all elements of a serious crime defined by national law” (UNGA, 2010).
The legal definition of terrorism is found under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), which defines it as “Any act with the intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security, economic security, or sovereignty of India or with the intent to strike terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or any foreign country”. However, much like the legal framework to counter it, the definition of terrorism in India has also evolved from the first time it was defined under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) of 1987 in India.
According to the TADA, terrorism was seen as acts done “With intent to overawe the Government as by law established or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people or to alienate any section of the people or to affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people adversely” (TADA, 1987). Furthermore, the definition specified methods covering the usage of explosives, bombs, lethal weapons, noxious gases and chemicals, as well as hostage taking (Khanna et al., 2018). Significantly, it focused on the intent of the act by recognising that terrorism was not just about violence but an attempt to intimidate the government, spread fear among people, create division, or disrupt communal harmony (Khanna et al., 2018).
Internationally, terrorism has also been defined in many ways. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines international terrorism as “Violent, criminal acts committed by individuals and/or groups who are inspired by, associated with, or designated as foreign terrorist organisations or nations (state-sponsored)” (FBI, n.d.). It recognises that terrorist threats may also arise from lone individuals who have been radicalised online and mobilise to violence quickly.
In response to these evolving threats, counterterrorism strategies have expanded beyond traditional policing and intelligence to include financial surveillance. India became a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 2010, which set global standards to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The FATF identifies high-risk countries and those under increased monitoring to protect international financial institutions (FAFT, n.d.).
These developments illustrate how counter-terrorism frameworks evolve in response to changing threat patterns, including digital radicalisation. However, at the same time, the developments and implementations of these policies are also shaped by a broader political context, which can influence how counter-terrorism priorities are defined and operationalised.
History of Counter-Terrorism Policy
The development of anti-terrorism policy in India has been closely intertwined with the country’s political and security context. The legislative and policy responses to terrorism have often emerged in the aftermath of major political crises or acts of violence. These committed acts of violence exposed perceived gaps in the state’s security framework and created a general feeling of fear for the country. One of the earliest instances of such legislation appeared following the assassination of then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984.
In response to rising concerns about militancy and internal security, the government introduced TADA. This marked the first major legislative effort specifically designated to address terrorism in India. The 1987 Act defined the punishment for terrorist acts, specifying that any person who has the intent to overawe the government or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people shall be punishable by death if their act has resulted in the death of any person. In other cases of conspiracy or concealment, the punishment ranged from imprisonment for a term of not less than five years, extendable to a life term (TADA, 1987). The act was amended in 1993 and finally lapsed under the sunset clause in 1995, but it remained highly criticised during its ten years of operation.
One major concern that arose was that of the act’s wide power to arrest and detain individuals without a trial or a charge for up to 180 days, which was extendable to a period of one year. It strengthened the existing power of the government to ban an organisation on limited evidence, with limited rights to judicial review (Bhuta, 2010). It also limited the transparency of the legal and judicial system by introducing special courts to hold closed hearings with undisclosed witnesses.
In March 1993, a series of 12 coordinated bomb blasts targeted the city of Mumbai, claiming more than 250 lives and injuring even more (BBC, 2015). The blasts invariably changed not just the city but also the way India viewed safety and security. The CBI in 1993 brought a 10,000-page primary charge-sheet filed against 189 accused, infamously also including Bollywood actor Sanjay Dutt (Livemint, 2017). Despite being introduced to enable a strong legal response to terrorism, the TADA also drew significant criticism regarding its implementation. Scholars and rights organisations note that some provisions of the Act granted broad discretionary powers to law enforcement agencies, which, in some cases, led to allegations of misuse.
Reports indicated that the legislation was sometimes employed for purposes beyond counter-terrorism, including the detention of political party workers in Kerala. The National Human Rights Commission of India (NHRC) also raised concerns about the application of the Act in Gujarat, where more than 19,000 cases had been registered under its provisions (Amnesty International, 1994).
In the wake of an international reaction to terrorism after the 2001 World Trade Center attack, coupled with threats of terrorism closer to home, the need for a new bold initiative to curb terrorism was realised.
The Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) was introduced in 2002 after the Red Fort attacks in 2000 and the Parliament attacks in 2001. The POTA adopted much of the same legal principles that were set out in the TADA. It also allowed for detention of a person without filing charges for up to 180 days (POTA, 2002). Only four months after its implication, security officials had arrested 250 people nationwide under the Act; this number jumped to over 940 people, with states like Jharkhand having detained a large number of people despite considerably low terrorism threats (Malpani, 2019). After only two years of operation, with a change in government leadership, the act was repealed in 2004 based on concerns over the misuse and human rights violations.
However, after the 2008 Mumbai attack that sent shockwaves across the country, the state migrated the preventive detention to the UAPA. The same UAPA, which was already a highly debated Act, was progressively amended in 2008 and, thereafter, in 2019. The 2019 amendment made a theoretical shift in the view of terrorism. In passing the 2019 Amendment Bill, Home Minister Amit Shah stated that terrorist acts are committed by individuals, not by organisations (PIB, 2019). This marked a fundamental shift in how the Indian state conceptualises terrorism, moving from a structural understanding to an individualised one.
In defining the terrorist act, the UAPA also further widens the scope of its application. It notes under section 15, that ‘Any Act’ with the intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security [economic, security] or sovereignty of India or with intent to strike terror or likely to strike terror in people or any section of people in India or in any foreign country (UAPA, 2019). Despite criticism towards the UAPA, it has remained in operation, resulting in the creation of a suspicion-based model, where the burden of proof shifts to the accused and the labels overpower trials. This has been reflected in the Supreme Court’s decisions in cases where UAPA charges have been brought. In 2024, the Supreme Court, while dismissing a bail application, held that under the Act, “Jail is the rule and bail is the exception” (Bhalla, 2024).
